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Abstract 
There is economic evidence that diversity has consequences for economic performance (see Alesina 
and La Ferrara, 2005). This might have consequences for immigration policy – how many immigrants 
to allow into a country and from what cultural background. But, central to such a discussion is the 
pace of cultural assimilation among immigrants – this under-researched topic is the focus of this 
paper. It investigates the extent and determinants of British identity among those living in Britain and 
the views on rights and responsibilities in societies. We find no evidence for a culture clash in general, 
and one connected with Muslims in particular. The vast majority of those born in Britain, of whatever 
ethnicity or religion, think of themselves as British and we find evidence that third-generation 
immigrants are more likely to think of themselves as British than second generation. Newly arrived 
immigrants almost never think of themselves as British but the longer they remain in the UK, the 
more likely it is that they do. This process of assimilation is faster for those from poorer and less 
democratic countries, even though immigrants from these countries are often regarded as a particular 
cause for concern. Our analysis of rights and responsibilities finds much smaller differences in views 
between the UK-born and immigrants than within the UK-born population.  
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Introduction 
Economists have had a lot to say about the economic effects of immigration (see Card, 1990, 1991, 
2005, Borjas et al, 1996, Borjas, 2003, Ottaviano and Peri, 2005 for varying US estimates and 
Fabbri et al, 2005; Manacorda et al, 2006 for UK estimates) but empirical estimates tend to suggest 
that the economic impact of immigration is not really large enough to be capable of explaining the 
strength of feeling many people have about immigration.  A plausible explanation for this is that 
popular concerns surrounding immigration are as much about the social and cultural impact of 
immigration as the economic impact – for example, Dustmann and Preston (2004) find that 
opposition to immigration is more closely related to racial intolerance than to fears about economic 
effects (also see Card, Dustmann and Preston, 2005, for an analysis of European attitudes to 
immigration).  If this is the case, it may be that economists’ analysis of immigration are missing the 
missing the most important issues.  For example, conventional economic theory (see Borjas, 1999, 
for a survey) predicts that the net gains from immigration are largest when the immigrants are most 
different from the natives but this is when the dangers (perceived or real) of ‘culture clash’ may tend 
to be highest.   
 There is a literature in economics on the costs and benefits of ethnic diversity (that might be 
thought to be related to cultural diversity) that is usefully surveyed by Alesina and La Ferrara 
(2005).  They review evidence like that presented by Easterly and Levine (1997) that ethnic 
fragmentation leads to lower growth in Africa and Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) that public 
good provision is lower in US cities with higher levels of ethnic diversity.  Alesina and La Ferrara 
(2005, p794) conclude that there is “overwhelming evidence” that public good provision is lower in 
fragmented societies” but also concede that there might be productivity benefits from diversity - see 
Ottaviano and Peri (2004) for one paper arguing there is evidence for this.  These findings might be 
taken as support for popular views that cultural diversity has costs - for example, Huntington (2004) 
expresses the fear that large-scale Mexican immigration jeopardizes the traditions and values (that 
he thinks are Protestant and English) that have made the United States the most powerful country in 
the world today.   
 If cultural diversity has costs and benefits then public policy needs to take account of them. 
This policy might be immigration policy (how many immigrants from what countries to allow in) or 
policy on the assimilation of immigrants once they are in the country e.g. forcing them to learn the 
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language (see Lazear, 1999) or taking exams in citizenship.  Such policies to increase cultural 
assimilation might be thought of as turning up the heat on the ‘melting pot’.  We already see 
evidence that governments are moving in this direction and against the policy of ‘multiculturalism’ 
that, according to some of its critics, has actively discouraged assimilation by excessive celebration 
of diversity1.  For example, the UK government introduced classes in citizenship into the national 
curriculum for schools in 2002 and since 2005 most immigrants acquiring British citizenship are 
required to pass a test of knowledge about British history and institutions (that many of the native-
born might struggle to pass) and to attend a citizenship ceremony intended to imbue them with a 
sense of pride in being British. 
 But, whether such policies are necessary depends crucially on the rate of cultural 
assimilation, the process by which the views and identities of individuals in a country change over 
time, and this is a question on which we have very little evidence.  We do have studies of the rate of 
economic assimilation of immigrants (see Chiswick, 1978; Borjas, 1999) but not many studies of the 
rate of cultural assimilation.  Perhaps the most relevant studies are those by Bisin and Verdier 
(2000), Bisin, Topa and Verdier (2004) who point out that small religious minorities in the US 
(specifically, Jews) have proved remarkably resilient in preserving their numbers and suggest this is 
because minority parents increase their investments in maintaining the distinct religious identity of 
their children.  But this failure of the ‘melting pot’ is not generally regarded as a cause for concern 
because religion is now regarded as a private matter in which differences in tastes can be readily 
accommodated within society without serious cost.  This paper primarily considers another aspect of 
identity – national identity and, in particular, the extent to which those living in Britain think of 
themselves as British. 
 One might legitimately wonder why this matters for the functioning of British society.  There 
are two answers.  First, this is perceived as very important by many people (see, for example, CRE, 
2005b) and, as such, becomes of political importance.  In the UK context the most celebrated 
example is the ‘Tebbit’ test – the then Cabinet Minister told the LA Times that "A large proportion 
of Britain's Asian population fail to pass the cricket test. Which side do they cheer for? It's an 
                                                 
1
 For example, Trevor Phillips the chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality in the UK argued in a TV interview 
that multiculturalism was leading to segregation, saying that “too many public authorities particularly [are] taking 
diversity to a point where they [are] saying, 'actually we're going to reward you for being different, we're going to give 
you a community centre only if you are Pakistani or African Caribbean and so on, but we're not going to encourage you 
to be part of the community of our town”1.   Some intellectual heavyweights have weighed in with their criticisms of 
multiculturalism – see Barry (2000), Parekh (2000) and Sen (2006). 
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interesting test. Are you still harking back to where you came from or where you are?"2,3.   At the 
heart of current debates about culture clash in the UK is the concern that among some groups, a 
growing fraction of those who live (and were perhaps born) in Britain do not think of themselves as 
British, have no aspiration to do so and do not want their children to either, subscribing instead to 
some other identity and creating little enclaves that resemble, as far as is possible, the countries from 
which they came or a model of the good society very different from what is generally thought of as 
‘British’. 
A second reason why the study of national identity may be important is that it is easy to find 
examples where clashes in national identity are symptoms of wider culture clashes.  We will give 
two examples from the UK.  As this paper shows, Catholics from Northern Ireland rarely think of 
themselves as British while Protestants do and this clash in national identities mirrors the wider 
culture clash within Northern Ireland.  Secondly, the statements of some British Muslims (the focus 
of most contemporary concern) appear to explicitly reject a British identity and affirm another one.  
One of the July 7 London bombers (British-born but whose parents were from Pakistan) appeared in 
a video and said “your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities 
against my people and your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly 
responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters”, with the use of the words 
‘your’ and ‘my’ clearly expressing the people with whom he identified4.   
The first part of this paper uses data on national identity from the UK Labour Force Survey 
to investigate the determinants of national identity in the UK.  The evidence here is firmly in favour 
of the culture club rather than culture clash view.  New immigrants rarely think of themselves as 
British but the longer they remain in the UK the more likely they are to do so.  Second generation 
immigrants are only slightly less likely to think of themselves as British than the white UK-born 
population and it seems that the gap narrows further with each generation.  This process of 
assimilation is faster for some immigrant groups than others but not in the way which might be 
expected.  For example immigrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh (the largest Muslim groups in the 
UK) are not less likely to feel British than those from other backgrounds and assimilate into a 
                                                 
2
 He followed this up with the following comment after the London bombings of July 7 2005 “if you have two cultures, 
you two societies living in the same territory and if you look around the world, you see that is a recipe for trouble.” 
3
 A similar example is given by Huntington (2005, p14) who castigates Mexican-Americans for booing the US soccer 
team when playing against Mexico in LA in 1998. 
4
 Though the way in which he chose to pursue his objectives was rather odd with almost 10% of those murdered being 
Muslim compared to under 3% in the total UK population. 
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British identity faster than the average while those from Western Europe and the United States do so 
more slowly with Italians standing out as the group which assimilates least.  We report evidence that 
immigrants from poorer and less democratic countries assimilate faster into a British identity and 
propose a simple model to explain this fact. 
 The finding that immigrants from other rich democracies do not generally come to think of 
themselves as British might lead one to argue that national identity is unimportant.  There is little 
concern about the fact that Italians rarely seem to come to think of themselves as British because it 
is felt that Italians have similar views on the way in which society should be run.  And it is the 
values that possibly lie behind British identity that must be more important to the functioning of 
society than any name that people use to identify themselves. 
 For this reason we turn to a analysis of the determinants of views on rights and 
responsibilities.  But, our findings here are very similar – the views of immigrants in general and 
immigrants from different countries in particular are generally insignificant and smaller than the 
differences among the UK-born population with different levels of education and of different ages.  
It is also true that the immigrant groups with different values are not the ones which are the focus of 
public concern e.g. Muslims do not emerge as having values very different from the UK-born white 
population.  We suggest that this is because the views on desirable rights and responsibilities vary 
much less among people across the world than is commonly believed. 
 These findings strongly suggest that the ‘culture club’ rather than ‘culture clash’ view is the 
correct one about the attitudes of immigrants into the UK.  This is not to deny the existence of some 
people who do not share these views and may be prepared to use violence to oppose them but the 
evidence suggests that these are such a minority as not to be detectable with the data sets used here.    
 
1. Who Thinks of Themselves as British? 
There is a small amount of existing evidence on the national identity of immigrants.  We have some 
ethnographic and focus groups studies (e.g. see the study by Lewis (1994) of Pakistanis in Bradford, 
and CRE (2005a,b) which was based on focus groups containing 96 people).  The largest 
quantitative study is Modood et al (1997, ppp328-331) which used data from the1994 National 
Survey of Ethnic Minorities finding that almost two-thirds of ethnic minorities agreed with the 
statement “In many ways, I think of myself as British”, with the highest rates among African Asians 
and the lowest among the Chinese.  But, here we use more recent data from a much larger sample. 
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a. Trends in British Identity 
The main data set used in this part of the paper is the Labour Force Survey.  It started collecting 
information on national identity in Spring 2001 though not in Northern Ireland.  The national 
identity question follows the questions about country of birth and, for immigrants, the question on 
when they arrived in the UK.  The specific question asked is “What do you consider your national 
identity to be? Please choose as many or as few as apply”.  There are six possible responses: British, 
English, Scottish, Welsh, Irish and ‘Other’.  The order in which these responses are listed depends 
on the country of residence so English is the first option in England, Scottish in Scotland and Welsh 
in Wales.  For the purposes of this paper we group British, English, Scottish and Welsh into a single 
‘British’ category and we will use the term British to refer to any of these answers in what follows5.  
We also combine the Irish into the ‘other’ identity category6. 
 Table 1 gives the cross-tabulation of British and ‘other’ identity using these definitions.  
Overall 94% report having a British identity and 7% an ‘other’ identity where the sample is 
restricted to those aged 16-60 inclusive.  These add to more than 100% because 1% report a multiple 
identity.  Because of the way the question is structured there are no observations recorded as having 
no national identity at all – these would be coded as non-responses.  But only 0.33% (weighted) do 
not respond to this question so most respondents are giving at least one answer to this question.  
There are, of course, questions about what respondents mean when they answer this question – it is 
quite possible that different respondents mean different things, some referring to their citizenship, 
others to the values that ‘Britain’ represents to them (see CRE, 2005a, for focus group discussions 
on what it means to be British).  As we are unable to dig into this deeper meaning, one should 
perhaps think of the enquiry into the determinants of a British identity as been in the spirit of Queen 
Elizabeth I not seeking to make “windows into men’s souls” when, after a period of vicious 
religious conflict in the sixteenth century, she sought only outward loyalty and was not too 
concerned about the specific religious feeling that lay within. 
                                                 
5
 This approach does ride rough-shod over the sizeable literature that discusses the nuances of separate national 
identities within the UK – see, for example, Colley (1992) for a historical analysis or McCrone (2002) for a more recent 
one.  We take the approach used here because no-one is at all concerned about the fact that many Scots describe 
themselves as Scottish and not British, and among those born in Scotland but living in England only 5% describe 
themselves as English. 
6
 Our main reason for doing this is that most of those reporting an Irish identity were born in the Republic of Ireland 
which is not part of the UK.  The only reason why one might not want to do this is because some of those in Northern 
Ireland choose to think of themselves as Irish and not British.    The classification of the Irish identity only affects the 
results reported for those from Ireland so is not of great importance for what follows given this fact. 
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 Figure 1 shows the trend in British identity over the sample period.  Over the 5-year period 
there is approximately a 1 percentage point fall in those expressing a British identity.  This is a small 
change but if it were to continue for decades it might cumulate to something important so it is 
perhaps important to try to understand it.  This quantitative evidence also perhaps lines up with the 
motivation for CRE (2005b) which focused on perceptions that ‘Britishness’ was in decline.  The 
single most important factor in determining whether a respondent thinks of themselves as British is, 
unsurprisingly, whether they were born in the UK.  The time series for the fraction reporting British 
identity for those born in the UK is shown in Figure 2 and for those born abroad in Figure 3.  There 
is no marked trend in British identity for those born in the UK but a more sizeable fall in British 
identity among immigrants.  The overall series of Figure 1 shows a downward trend both partly 
because the extent of British identity among immigrants is falling but mostly because the fraction 
foreign-born is rising over this period.  However Figures 2 and 3 make it clear that there are some 
UK-born individuals who do not think of themselves as British and some immigrants who do think 
of themselves as British – it is the factors associated with this variation that is the subject of the first 
part of this paper.  Because the levels of British identity are so different we conduct separate 
analyses for each group. 
 
b. British Identity Among the UK-Born 
We first investigate the effect of demographic characteristics on the probability of reporting British 
identity among the UK-born.  It is worth noting that 98.8% of the sample report a British identity so 
a non-British identity is a rare event.  We investigate the impact of a number of factors. 
- gender 
- age 
- education, measured as years left full-time education and a dummy variable for full-
time student 
- region of residence 
- country of birth within the UK (i.e. England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland) 
- ethnicity 
- religion 
- time trend 
 8 
Descriptive statistics are summarized in Table A1. We estimate a probit model in which the 
outcome variable is reporting a British identity and all of the regressors are included separately.  The 
results are reported in Table 2 where the marginal effects from a probit regression have been 
multiplied by 100.  If we pool all respondents together we get the results reported in column 1.  We 
will discuss the sets of variables in turn, approximately in order of importance. 
 The largest marginal effect by a large distance is the effect of being born in Northern Ireland 
– this reduces the probability of reporting a British identity by 24%.  It is almost certain that this is 
driven primarily by Northern Irish Catholics among whom there remains a strong demand to be part 
of Ireland and not the UK and who think of themselves as Irish rather than British.  Supporting 
evidence for this view comes from Moxon-Browne (1991) about the reported national identity of 
those living in Northern Ireland.  In 1989 68% of Protestants in Northern Ireland called themselves 
British, 3% Irish, 10% Ulster and 16% Northern Irish.  For Catholics 6% described themselves as 
British, 60% as Irish, 2% as Ulster and 25% as Northern Irish.  This is a perhaps useful benchmark 
as we know that the identity conflict between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland has been 
associated with considerable violence mostly in Northern Ireland but also on the mainland with over 
3000 deaths since the Troubles began in the 1960s7.  This culture clash has been associated with 
significant support among the general population for the use of violence to attain political ends e.g. 
Hayes and McAllister (2001) show that in 1978 16% of Protestants and 25% of Catholics thought 
‘violence is a legitimate way to achieve one’s goals’ while in 1998 31% of Protestants and 21% of 
Catholics had a little or lots of sympathy with the use of violence. 
 Now consider the effect of ethnicity on British indentity.  All non-white ethnic groups have a 
lower probability of reporting a British identity with marginal effects for all apart from the ‘other’ 
groups being in 2-5% range though none of these groups have an incidence of non-British identity 
that is anywhere near the level of those born in Northern Ireland.  There is no particular pattern 
among the different groups e.g. the overwhelmingly Muslim Pakistanis/Bangladeshis do not stand 
out as having very much lower levels of British identity than other ethnic minority groups.  Now 
consider the effect of religion – even though this might be thought to be many to be extremely 
important, the estimates suggest otherwise – the effect of religion is small.  And among religious 
groups the pattern is not what might be expected - Muslims do not stand out as having especially 
                                                 
7
 Though it is also worth noting that the identity conflict remains to the present although the violence in recent years has 
been very greatly reduced if not quite entirely eliminated. 
 9 
low levels of British identity – Sikhs are noticeably lower and Hindus slightly lower.  It is also 
interesting to note that Jewish respondents are more likely to report a British identity than the 
Christian default group even though few Jewish people in the UK could trace their UK roots back 
more than 4 or 5 generations – this gives an insight into cultural assimilation over a period of a 100 
years or more8.  This all suggests that the vast majority of those born on the British mainland think 
of themselves as British whatever their ethnicity or religion.  Any culture clash in identity is very 
small compared to that found in Northern Ireland9.  This does line up with the focus group evidence 
(CRE, 20005a) where, for example, British-born Muslims saw no difficulty in being both British 
and Muslim and with opinion poll evidence that under 5% of Muslims in Britain think the July 7 
bombings were justified (a much smaller proportion than support violence in Northern Ireland).  
 The effects of other variables are small – education, gender, age – though often significant as 
the sample size is so large.  Of some interest is the effect over the life-cycle.  Because of the large 
sample size we can include a dummy variable for each age – the predicted probability of reporting a 
British identity for someone of different ages is shown in Figure 4. 
 It is also worth noting that the estimate time trend in column 1 of Table 2 is positive 
suggesting that, among the British-born there is no downward trend in feelings of British identity. 
The results so far are an aggregate across all ethnic groups and perhaps the effects of certain 
variables differ by ethnic group.  Columns 2-7 of Table 2 investigate this.  The sample sizes for the 
non-white groups are fairly small so many of the variables are insignificant and many of the 
variables have similar effects.  But, a few findings are worth noting – among the white population 
the more educated are significantly less likely to think of themselves as British while among Asians 
the opposite is true.  And black women are more likely than black men to think of themselves as 
British though the effect is not very large.  Perhaps most noteworthy is that the trend increases in 
British identity are largest among the Asian and Black groups with the estimates suggesting a rise in 
British identity of 19 percentage pints for Asians and 10 percentage points for Blacks over a decade.  
This is not particularly surprising as British identity among the white group could not increase by 
much more but it is not consistent with the view that any of these groups have a crisis in British 
identity.   
                                                 
8
 It is worth noting that Jewish immigration into the UK around 1900 caused widespread fears of ‘culture clash’ and 
prompted the first legislation designed to limit immigration (see Winder, 2004, for an account of this). 
9
 One should not make light of the size of the conflict in Northern Ireland as, if transplanted to the mainland the same 
death rate would have seen over 100000 deaths.   
 10 
 The findings so far suggest there is only one group of British-born individuals with a large 
percentage who do not think of themselves as British – those born in Northern Ireland.  Levels of 
British identity are lower among ethnic minorities but this may be because these are more likely to 
be second- or third-generation immigrants than whites.  This is a plausible explanation for why the 
time trend among British-born Asians and Black groups is larger than for the white groups – over 
time, a higher proportion of these are third- rather than second-generation etc.  Unfortunately the 
LFS does not have the information on country of birth of the parents but there are more indirect 
ways in which we can get evidence for this. 
 First we include a variable to represent whether the household contains someone who was 
not born in the UK - this is reported in the final column of Table 2.  It has a significantly negative 
effect on the probability of feeling British and the coefficients on the ethnicity variables are more 
muted.  This is what we would expect if, as seems likely, those who are second-generation 
immigrants are more likely to be in a household containing an immigrant. 
 Secondly, if consider young people living at home we can directly identify the country of 
birth of their parents as the LFS samples all individuals in target households.  Taking this approach, 
Table 3 investigates the determinants of national identity among those aged 16 to 24.  The first 
column estimates the same equation as the first column of Table 2 for everyone in this age group 
whether they are still living with their parents or not - the pattern of variation in British identity is 
similar to that found among the entire adult population.  Religion is completely insignificant among 
this group so there is no evidence here of sizeable numbers of Muslim youth who are disaffected 
with Britain to the extent of not reporting themselves as British.  The second column then drops the 
religion variables completely to increase the sample size to include the period from March 2001 
rather than March 2002.  The third column then keeps the specification the same but changes the 
sample to those who ever report in the 5 waves of the LFS that they are a child relative to the 
household reference person (in which case we can identify the country of birth of their parents).  A 
comparison of columns 2 and 3 gives us some insight into the effect of selecting the sample to be 
young people who have not yet left home.  The only coefficient for which this makes a sizeable 
difference is the variable for having being born in Northern Ireland which drops from a marginal 
effect of -28.7 percentage points to -8.6 percentage points10 – the coefficients on the other ethnicity 
                                                 
10
 The obvious explanation for this is that we are now restricting the sample to those who, although they were born in 
Northern Ireland, have parents who are resident on the mainland suggesting that they spent a large part of their 
childhood outside Northern Ireland and hence feel less link to the province and connection with its conflict.   
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dummies are qualitatively similar.  The fourth column then includes a dummy variable for whether 
the parent is UK born – we find that having a foreign-born parent reduces the probability of 
reporting a British identity by a significant 1.9 percentage points.  Perhaps more importantly it also 
has the effect of markedly reducing the ethnicity coefficients e.g. reducing the Indian coefficient 
from -5.6 to -1.3, the Pakistani coefficient from -6.0 to -1.3, the Bangladeshi from -1.9 to -0.1 etc.  
This is exactly what we would expect if successive generations of immigrants are more likely to feel 
British and implies that third-generation ethnic minority immigrants are only very slightly likely to 
feel less British than the white population.   We also investigate the existence of a ‘generation gap’ 
using the fact that sometimes it is the young person themselves who responds and sometimes it is a 
proxy response (which will most commonly be a parent).  In column 5 we find that a proxy response 
when the household reference person is not UK-born is associated with being significantly less 
likely to report a British identity though the effect is small.  Young second-generation immigrants 
think of themselves as more British than their parents would like to think.  
 All of this suggests that there is no problem with British identity among the UK-born.  But 
what about the foreign-born? 
 
c. British Identity Among the Foreign-Born 
In studying the extent of British identity among the foreign-born we will use all the variables 
previously described but there are some additional ones that are of interest – notably the country of 
birth, the age of arrival into the UK and the time since arrival.  
There is a large amount of variation across country of birth in the fraction of immigrants 
reporting a British identity.  For those from Slovakia it is less than 5%, for those from Malta more 
than 80%.  But there is, for the most part a simple explanation for these very large cross-country 
differences – the average amount of time spent in the UK.  Figure 5 plots the fraction reporting a 
British identity against average number of years in the UK where each observation is a country of 
birth.  The positive relationship is very clear, a first indication that feeling British is something that 
grows on you.  We have also marked on Figure 5 some individual countries, singled out for a variety 
of reasons.  There are two very marked outliers – Ireland and Italy.  Ireland might be explained by 
the fact that there is an explicit ‘Irish’ answer to the question on national identity though is also 
likely to be partly explained by the long fight for Irish independence, something that lies behind the 
low level of British identity already noted among Northern Irish Catholics.  The low level of British 
 12 
identity among Italian immigrants has no such obvious explanation – perhaps it is the atrocious food 
and coffee they can never come to accept.   
 Other countries are not such marked outliers as these but there are countries that lie above 
and below the line, suggesting that for a given time in the UK they are more or less likely to report a 
British identity than the average.  But what is striking is that it is not the countries from which 
immigrants are commonly perceived as a ‘problem’ who are below the line.  For example, 
Pakistanis are, if anything, above the line as are Somalis, a group that is often felt to integrate rather 
badly and does extremely badly economically.  We have also marked other Muslim countries which 
have large numbers of immigrants in Britain – Bangladesh, Turkey, and Egypt.  This is a first 
indication of results that we will confirm with a more sophisticated result below – there is no 
evidence in this data for a particular problem with British identity among immigrants from countries 
very different from the UK   If anything, the countries below the line are countries like the US, 
Canada and France. 
 Figure 5 is intriguing but not compelling so we now turn to an analysis of the individual 
data.  We estimate probit models for British identity using the same explanatory variables as for the 
UK-born but also include as controls, country of birth and age at which they came to the country.  
These ‘assimilation’ equations have a parallel in the economics literature where the evolution of 
immigrant’s earnings is investigated (see Chiswick, 1978; Borjas, 1999).  
 In general we might expect identity to depend on age, age of arrival in the UK, date and year 
of arrival in the UK.  It is impossible to separately identify all of these possible effects because there 
are identities between them (see Borjas, 1999, for a discussion of these issues in relation to 
estimating earnings equations for immigrants).  After experimentation we settled on modelling 
British identity as a function of the age of arrival in the UK and the time since arrival.  The time 
since arrival variable will capture any true life-cycle effects but, as these are small for the UK-born 
(see Figure 4), it is reasonable to assume that most of the effects of time since arrival are 
assimilation effects.  It is also possible that the time since arrival variable captures cohort effects 
caused by the changing nature of immigrants but we find similar qualitative effects of time since 
arrival for all immigrant groups so think that the assimilation explanation is the more plausible.  
Because of the large sample size we include a separate dummy variable for each age of arrival and 
each year since arrival.  We also include 17 dummy variables for broad country or region of birth  
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 Table 4 reports the marginal effects for selected covariates for the estimated model for all 
immigrants.  The largest and most significant effects here are country of birth effects.  The excluded 
category are immigrants from Western Europe.  One can see that Irish immigrants are much less 
likely to think of themselves as British than any other group.  Those from the US are less likely to 
think of themselves as British though the difference is not significantly different from zero.  
However those from Canada, Australia and New Zealand are significantly more likely to think of 
themselves as British, probably because many have some British ancestry.  But it is when one 
moves away from the OECD countries that one sees very large positive marginal effects.  
Immigrants from Eastern Europe are 18.7% more likely to think of themselves as British but for 
immigrants from most developing countries the marginal effects are around 30%.  There is no very 
marked difference between immigrants from India and those from Pakistan and Bangladesh.   
 Other variables are much less important than country of birth.   Non-white ethnic groups are, 
for the most part, less likely to think of themselves as British with particularly large effects among 
those with Black African and Chinese heritages.  Interestingly, Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
immigrants are more likely to report a British identity than white immigrants though the effect is not 
significantly different from zero.  Religion has smaller effects and perhaps not in the direction one 
might think e.g. Muslims are more likely than any other religious group to think of themselves as 
British. 
 One explanation for these findings is that immigrants from poorer countries are more likely 
to find it in their interests to acquire British citizenship and that they then mechanically think of 
themselves as British.  To examine this, the second column of Table 4 uses UK citizenship as the 
dependent variable – the pattern of coefficients is very similar to that seen in column 1 suggestive of 
a strong link between British identity and citizenship among immigrants11.  But column 3 shows that 
not all of the results can be explained by the adoption of citizenship as it includes citizenship as an 
extra regressor in a regression where the dependent variable is British identity.  This has a very 
powerful effect on feeling British – a marginal effect of 57% - but the pattern of differentials by 
country of birth remains, albeit muted.  
                                                 
11
  We do not pretend to be able to disentangle causality here – one might take citizenship because one felt British or 
feel that as soon as one has citizenship one is British.   
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Turning to the effect of age at arrival and time since arrival, Figure 6 plots the predicted 
probability by age at arrival for a new immigrant from Western Europe who is white, Christian, 
male and left education at 18.  The pattern one sees is very sensible.  Those who arrived as babies 
are 15% more likely to think of themselves as British but age of arrival has no effect once one 
arrives as an adult.  Figure 7 investigates the effect of years since arrival which has a more powerful 
effect.  The estimates suggest that no immigrants feel British on arrival into the UK but that, after 40 
years, more than half of them do.  Figure 7 also shows the pattern of time since arrival effects after 
controlling for citizenship (i.e. based on the estimates in column 3 of Table 4) – these are more 
muted as a longer time in the UK produces makes an immigrant more likely to become a citizen.  
But there remain sizeable assimilation effects. 
 It is tempting to interpret these assimilation effects as causal but it could be caused by 
selective attrition.  We know that many immigrants return to their countries of origin and if 
immigrants who feel British are more likely to remain then this would expect that, among the 
immigrants, who remain the fraction with a British identity rises over time but without any 
necessary causal effect.  In duration models this is the problem of separating true duration 
dependence from unobserved heterogeneity.  But it is not plausible to think that most of the 
assimilation effects seen in Figure 7 can be explained in this way as to do so would require a rate of 
return migration far in excess of what is plausible.  To give an example suppose that no immigrant 
ever changes their national identity – some feel British on arrival and some do not.  Figure 7 
suggests that at most 2% of immigrants are in the first category.  For the observed proportion of 
immigrants feeling British to rise to 50% after 50 years would require 98% of those who do not feel 
British and 0% of those who do feel British to return home (with an overall return migration rate of 
96%).  Our best estimates of return migration suggest an overall return migration rate of 50% 
(Dustmann, 2006) and this is not obviously strongly correlated with feeling British.  To investigate 
this we take immigrants observed in the first wave of the LFS and see whether they are still in the 
sample at wave 5.  If they are not this may be because they have changed address (including leaving 
the UK) or because of non-response.  But, once we control for time since arrival those who do not 
report a British identity are actually 0.05% more likely to be present in the household in wave 5, 
though the t-statistic on this is 0.07.  The assimilation effects seen in Figure 7 are simply too strong 
to be primarily explained by unobserved heterogeneity (though part of the profile may be due to this 
cause) and can only be explained by sizeable assimilation. 
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 The empirical specification used so far has allowed immigrants from different countries to 
differ in the level of British identity but not in the rate of assimilation.  However, there may well 
also be important differences in the rate of assimilation.  To that end, we estimated separate 
equations for different countries and regions of birth and computed the predicted probability of 
feeling British by years since arrival.  In these equations the sample sizes mean we cannot estimate 
precisely a dummy variable for each year since arrival so we approximate by a quartic – in the 
aggregate this works well – see Figure 7.  The first set of results are shown in Figure 8 where we 
show the own rates of assimilation and the aggregate for comparison.  It is very noticeable that rates 
of assimilation are lower for those from richer countries and higher for those from poorer countries.  
Among the poor countries there is no tendency for those from predominantly Muslim countries to 
have lower rates of assimilation – if anything, it is the opposite.  The second set of estimates 
summarized in Figure 9 include a control for citizenship.  This is important because those from 
poorer countries are more likely to acquire citizenship.  The differences are less marked but 
qualitatively the same. 
 These patterns of variation by country/region of birth in the rate of assimilation among 
immigrants to Britain raise the question of whether there is any systematic pattern to this - are 
immigrants from certain types of countries more or less likely to feel British?    The last part of this 
section investigates this and we start by speculating on the factors that might be important.  First, we 
have seen that those immigrants who become UK citizens are much more likely to report a British 
identity and the take-up of citizenship might be influenced by a number of factors.  First, there are a 
number of practical advantages to citizenship – one has the right to work and vote in the UK and one 
can travel into the country without the need for a visa.  To account for these, we include dummy 
variables for coming from an EU-15 countries and the A-8 countries who have the automatic right to 
work in the UK, a binary variable ‘Visa’ taking the value 1 if citizens from that country require a 
visa to enter the UK and a binary variable “Commonwealth” denoting that the immigrant comes 
from a Commonwealth country who have the right to vote in all UK elections (there may also be 
closer affinities between these countries and Britain).  Apart from the practical advantages, there 
may be more emotional advantages to adopting a British identity.  In particular we hypothesize that 
immigrants may be more likely to express a British identity if Britain compares favourably with the 
country from which they came.  The dimensions of this comparison might be economic so we 
include log GDP per capita, or political, so we include the Polity IV measure of 
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democracy/autocracy12, or connected with civil liberties (so we include the Freedom House measure 
of press freedom)13.   
The fourth column of Table 4 shows what happens when we include these variables instead 
of the country/region of birth variables.  The standard errors are clustered on country and we 
exclude the Irish because they are such an outlier.  When we simply include the levels of these 
variables we find that immigrants from richer countries are significantly less likely to think of 
themselves as British, as are those from strong democracies.  Those from countries with a free press 
are more likely to feel British but this is not significant.  Being from a Commonwealth country has a 
powerful positive effect while being from an A8 country has a significant negative effect.  This does 
provide some evidence that immigrants from ‘worse’ countries are more likely to assimilate into 
Britain.  Because this might be correlated with the incentive to acquire citizenship, we include a 
control for citizenship in the fifth column of Table 4.  This does weaken the effect of per capita GDP 
and the democracy measure but they remain significant.  The same is true when, as in the final two 
columns of Table 4 we estimate separate equations for citizens and non-citizens. 
These specifications assume the country variables have a level effect, but they might also 
affect the rate of assimilation so we then estimate a model in which a quartic in time here is 
interacted with the country-level variables.  There are too many coefficients to report all the results 
but the terms involving the country-level variables are all jointly significantly different from zero for 
all variables except the press freedom measure.  To summarize results, we plot the predicted 
assimilation profiles for different types of individuals.  Figure 10 does this for democracy/autocracy 
showing that immigrants from democracies assimilate less quickly.  Figure 11 shows the same for 
GDP per capita with the result that those from richer countries assimilate more slowly.  These 
results hold whether or not one controls for the immigrant being a UK citizen.   
 
d. A Simple Model to Explain Our Findings 
The finding that immigrants from countries most dissimilar to the UK are more likely to 
come to feel British is interesting because it is perhaps unexpected as one suspects that their 
behaviour remains more distinct.  Here we propose a simple ‘identity’ model (along the lines 
pioneered in economics by Akerlof and Kranton, 2000) to explain which immigrants adopt a British 
                                                 
12
 More details can be found at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/. 
13
 More details can be found at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1  
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identity (see Shayo, 2005, for a model designed to explain the related concept of national pride that 
could also be used to explain a desire to be on the ‘winning side’ as an explanation for our findings).  
Assume that immigrants have to choose some behaviour or value, x, and how British they feel, b 
which we treat as a continuous variable on the unit interval.  There are norms of behaviour both in 
the culture of origin, xo, and in Britain, xb.  Immigrants suffer a loss if their behaviour deviates both 
from the norm of their culture of origin and the norm in Britain so they feel torn between the two 
cultures – this is a simple way of capturing the cultural tension experienced by many immigrants.  
By choosing to be British they can increase the weight on the deviation from the British norm and 
reduce it on the norm of the culture of origin.  However there is also a loss from ‘betraying one’s 
roots’ by being British at all.  We represent the loss function for the immigrant as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 2 20 1, 1 2bL x b b x x b x x bθ θ α= − − − + + − +  (1) 
where θ  is the weight on deviations from the norm of origin and α  is the cost of betraying one’s 
roots.  Define bβ θ= + , and consider the optimal behaviour.  Minimizing (1) with respect to x, we 
get that:  
 ( )0* 1 bx x xβ β= + −  (2) 
so that optimal behaviour is a weighted average of the cultural norm of origin and the British norm 
with the weight being influence by how British the person feels.  Define ( )20bx xδ = − , a measure 
of cultural distance between Britain and their country of origin and substituting into (1) we get:  
 ( ) ( ) ( )21* 1
2
L β δβ β α β θ= − + −  (3) 
Minimizing this with respect to β  leads to:  
 *
2
αθ δβ
α δ
−
=
−
 (4) 
which implies that:  
 
( )2 1
*
2
b
δ θ
α δ
−
=
−
 (5) 
For the minimization problem to have an interior solution we need to make the assumptions that 
2α δ>  and that 2 1θ > .  With these assumptions we get the result that the optimal level of British 
identity depends negatively on the cost of ‘betraying one’s roots’,α , and positively on the influence 
of the British on the loss function, θ .  But it also depends positively on δ  the difference in norms 
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between the culture of origin and those of the British.  Hence the model predicts that those from 
cultures that are most dissimilar from Britain are more likely to adopt a British identity as found in 
the empirical results.  The intuition is best understood by thinking of those who come from cultures 
identical to Britain – these immigrants are under no pressure to change their behaviour so have no 
incentive to increase the weight on the British component of the loss function and will only suffer a 
loss by betraying their roots if they become British. 
If, as seems plausible, the influence of Britain, θ ,  rises over time then we can also explain 
why immigrants come to feel more British over time, and at a faster rate for those from more 
dissimilar countries. 
 Note that the model does not predict that immigrants from very different countries come to 
be as similar in behaviour.  Putting (4) into (2) we have that:  
 ( ) ( ) [ ]( )( )
2
2 2
2
1
* 1 *
2b
x x
α θ δδ β δ
α δ
− −
− = − =
−
 (6) 
which, in the region of 0δ =  is increasing in δ . 
 One can also explain why certain groups may seek to segregate themselves which 
one can interpret as a reduction in θ  (see Bisin et al, 2006, for some British evidence on such 
endogenous segregation).  However, the data do not suggest this is the dominant factor in the data 
and do not have sufficiently disaggregated regional information so we do not explore this further 
here. 
 
 e. Conclusion on Identity 
The evidence provided on national identity is clear and authoritative.  When asked a direct 
question, most respondents can say whether they are British or not and there are clear patterns of 
regularities in their responses.  Few recently-arrived immigrants think of themselves as British but 
the fraction who do grows over time.  Those who come at an earlier age and from poorer, less 
democratic countries are more likely to do so.  We have suggested that this is because the greater 
culture clash experienced by these immigrants actually increases their incentives to become British.
 The data on national identity do not support any alarmism about the effects of immigration in 
general or Muslims in particular on national identity.  But, perhaps this misses the point of people’s 
fears surrounding the cultural assimilation of immigrants.  There is little concern that the Italian 
immigrants who never feel British are causing problems but more concern that Pakistani immigrants 
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(who feel British at about the average rate for immigrants) are doing so.  The reason is that it is 
values that are more important than national identity.  – Italians are thought to have values close to 
our own but there is more uncertainty about the value systems of some other groups of immigrants.  
There are debates in our intellectual magazines about what it means to be British but we do not 
know if the respondents to the LFS apply the same criteria – it may be that those born in the UK 
report they are British simply because of their country of birth and their response says nothing about 
the values they think important (see CRE, 2005a, for focus group evidence on what being British 
means to people).  The analysis so far has been in the spirit of ‘windows into men’s souls’, asking 
only if people think of themselves as British and not asking what they mean by that.   
 
2. Values 
For an analysis of values we turn to the Home Office Citizenship Surveys (HOCS).  This survey has 
been conducted every two years since 2001 though the questions we use for analysis come from the 
2003 and 2005 surveys.  In each year the sample consists of a nationally representative ‘core’ 
sample of slightly under 10000 adults, and a ‘boost’ sample of slightly under 5000 ethnic minority 
adults designed to ensure there were enough sample members form the main ethnic groups in the 
UK.  More details of the survey and its methodology can be found in Green and Farmer (2004) and 
Michaelson et al (2006). 
  HOCS contains information on the usual demographics, country of birth and (in 2005) year 
of arrival in the UK.  We are interested in the answers to the questions on rights and responsibilities.  
Respondents are asked the following set of questions “Now some questions about the rights of 
people living in the UK. By rights I mean the things that people are entitled to if they live in this 
country.  First I will ask you about rights that you think you should have and then next the rights that 
you actually have”, followed by a list of 9 rights.  These are listed in Table 5 together with the mean 
responses.  Large majorities are in favour of all of these rights though there is more disagreement 
about the rights to a job and the welfare state (issues that have been at the heart of political debates 
in Britain for much of the period since 1945).  There is generally a perceived gap between the rights 
one should have and the rights one actually has.  The second part of Table 5 splits the responses into 
the UK-born and immigrants.  Immigrants are, with the exception of a right to a job, less likely than 
the UK-born to believe in the rights listed though immigrants are often more likely to think they 
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actually have those rights in Britain.  However, it is still the case that over 80% of immigrants 
believe in each of the rights listed. 
The survey then goes on to ask about responsibilities with the question ‘on this card are 
things which some people feel should be the responsibilities of every person living in the UK.  
Which, if any, do you feel should be the responsibility of everyone living in the UK?’, followed by 
the 11 items listed in Table 6 together with the responses.  The general pattern is that the vast 
majority think that all 11 are responsibilities though voting comes out lowest with 80% support.  
The UK-born do have higher proportions believing in these responsibilities than immigrants but the 
differences are all small. 
 Now let us consider the determinants of beliefs in different rights and responsibilities.  We 
only report results using a composite measure of the rights and responsibilities respondents feel they 
should have that is scaled to be zero if the respondent believes in none of them and 100 if they 
believe in all of them.  This is based on the idea that one thinks of all the rights and responsibilities 
are ‘good things’ though some may be judged more important than others and all of the measures 
show a high level of congruence with a Cronbach’s alpha above 0.814.  Table 7 uses as dependent 
variable the measure of rights one should have.  The first column pools natives and immigrants.   
A first point to note is that there are highly significant effects of age and education on belief 
in rights with the older and more educated believing they should have a greater number of rights.  
This does tally with popular concerns that young people and less-educated are more inclined to be 
‘anti-social’15.  These differences within the UK-born population are much larger and more 
systematic than any effects we find of other variables and between the UK- and foreign-born.  For 
example, religion is not significant (with the exception of being Jewish) - the effect of being Muslim 
is not significantly different from zero.  The effects of ethnicity are also small.  Those with as 
country of birth outside the OECD (excluding Ireland) are likely to believe in fewer rights but these 
effects are quite small and generally not significantly different from zero. 
The second column of Table 7 then restricts the sample to the UK-born.  Education and age 
remain important and there is a modest negative effect of being Asian or black.  Religion is 
completely unimportant.  The third column then restricts the sample to immigrants.  The sample size 
                                                 
14
 We did originally report results for each individual question but found no interesting differences when doing this so 
ended up using a single composite measure. 
15
 For example, the word ‘Chav’, named by the Oxford English Dictionary as ‘word of the year’ in 2004, has sprung to 
prominence in the past few years and has connotations of anti-social behaviour. 
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is smaller so fewer coefficients are significant but the qualitative pattern is similar.  However the age 
effects are more marked.  This could be because they include assimilation effects – however the 
variable time since arrival is completely insignificant when included in the fourth column (the 
sample size drops here as this variable is only available for the 2005 survey).  The fifth column 
restricts the sample to immigrants from the OECD and Europe and the sixth column to those form 
the rest of the world.  There do not seem any very marked differences though the age profile for 
those from the rest of the world is the most marked.    The final column replaces the country of birth 
variables by the country characteristics previously used in the study of national identity.  These 
variables are all insignificant.   
We suggest there is a simple explanation for this.  The rights and responsibilities considered 
in this survey are those considered useful for the workings of a liberal democracy but not all 
countries are liberal democracies.  However, data from the World Values Survey suggests near-
universal support for an institution like democracy – for example, 87% of Britons think democracy 
is a fairly or very good political system compared to 98% of Bangladeshis, 82% of Pakistanis, 83% 
of Poles and 92% of Indians.  It is also likely that immigrants into the UK are also selected on belief 
in those values so that immigrants from these countries are more likely to believe in democracy than 
the average.   
Table 8 does the same exercise as Table 7 but with the dependent variable changed to the 
measure of the rights actually possessed.  The pattern of findings is very similar – there is perhaps a 
hint that those from poorer countries are more impressed with the rights they have in Britain than the 
UK-born and those from richer countries.  Finally Table 9 changes the dependent variable to 
responsibilities.  The qualitative findings are, again, very similar.  
 This analysis of views on rights and responsibilities again suggests that the culture club view 
is more appropriate than the culture clash view.  There is certainly no evidence here in support of 
views like that expressed by Huntington (2005, p188) that “Muslim minorities have proved to be 
‘indigestible’ by non-Muslim society”.  It is hard to find marked differences in views on rights and 
responsibilities across different groups and any differences that are found are smaller than exist 
between young and old, educated and less-educated. 
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3. Conclusion 
 For national identity there is clear evidence of cultural assimilation – for values there is not 
assimilation but there are no very big differences to begin with.  This suggests that fears about 
culture clash in modern Britain are ill-founded.  Among the UK-born it is very rare for someone to 
deny a British identity and the only sizeable group that does so would seem to be Northern Irish 
Catholics.  Those from ethnic minorities are less likely to report a British identity but we presented 
evidence that this is less true for the third- as compared to second-generation immigrants.  Newly-
arrived immigrants almost never think of themselves as British but the feeling grows on them, the 
longer they remain.  This assimilation into a British identity is faster for those from poorer, less 
democratic countries and there is no evidence that there is a problem with the assimilation of 
Muslims. 
 The culture club view should not be taken to imply that there are no problems or no potential 
for conflict.  Those with extremist views do exist and have the potential to cause problems 
disproportionate to their numbers (which are too small to be detectable in the surveys used here).  
And just because most people in Britain have a shared national identity and shared views on rights 
and responsibilities does not mean they cannot disagree, or that some of these disagreements may be 
along cultural or religious lines.  For example, though most express a belief in free speech as an 
abstract concept, most also think there should be some limits (e.g. against slander, against the 
incitement to racial or religious hatred) but where the lines should be drawn is subject to more 
debate. 
Without taking any particular position on who is right and who is wrong, there are likely to 
be tensions when the majority view about how everybody should be allowed to live their lives 
comes into conflict with the minority view.  In part such conflicts are influenced by the spheres that 
are regarded as ‘private’ and ‘public’.   Where this line is drawn does vary across time and space 
e.g. religion used to be a matter of compulsion but is now seen more as a personal choice, Muslim 
schoolgirls in France are not allowed to wear the hijab but policewomen in London are allowed to 
do so.  But there are some areas where interaction between individuals is inevitable and there is 
some regulation of what is acceptable e.g. the education of children where the state takes an active 
role that primarily reflects the views of the majority but may conflict with the desires of some 
minorities. 
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 There is also one very important question that has not been touched upon in this paper.  We 
have seen that almost all of the UK-born see themselves as British and that most immigrants come 
to do so as well if they remain in the UK long enough.  But, do the white UK-born population think 
of all of these people of British?  We have some evidence perhaps that they do not.  Fr example, the 
2003 British Social Attitudes Survey asked the respondents to say whether they agreed or disagreed 
with the statement “Muslims are more loyal to Muslims than to Britain”.  Of the non-Muslim 
respondents only 9% disagreed with a further 25% neither disagreeing nor disagreeing.  But, among 
the Muslim respondents (who we might expect to be better-informed on the subject) 45% disagreed, 
a significant difference even though the survey only contained 20 Muslim respondents.  And 62% of 
non-Muslim respondents thought there was a fairly or very serious conflict between Muslims and 
non-Muslims in Britain, compared to 27% of Muslims16.  A more serious culture clash may be the 
refusal of the majority population to see minorities as British and it would be useful to think about 
how people see others as much as how they see themselves (see Glaeser, 2005, for a model along 
these lines). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 Another question about conflicts in the world as a whole between Muslims and non-Muslims had 85% of non-
Muslims say they thought there was a fairly or very serious conflict and 67% of Muslims. 
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Table 1 
British and Other Identities 
 
Other Identity   
No Yes Total 
No 0.00 6.20 6.20  British 
Identity Yes 92.88 0.93 93.80  
 Total 92.88 7.12 100.00 
 
Notes:  Statistics derived from LFS March 2001- March 2006 and relates to those aged 16 or over – 
grossing weights are used.  Total sample size is 1970394. 
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Table 2 
British Identity Among the UK-born 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 All White Mixed Asian Black Chinese Other All 
Ethnicity         
-1.465       -1.433 Mixed:  White/Black 
Caribbean [0.632]*       [0.624]* 
-3.977  -2.764     -3.705 Mixed: White/Black 
African [1.677]*  [2.021]     [1.587]* 
Mixed: White/Asian -3.017  -1.074     -2.741 
 [0.950]**  [1.146]     [0.903]** 
Mixed: Other -5.068  -2.999     -4.708 
 [1.308]**  [1.496]*     [1.246]** 
Indian -3.271       -2.796 
 [0.787]**       [0.705]** 
Pakistani -4.576   -0.151    -3.851 
 [1.154]**   [1.334]    [1.024]** 
Bangladeshi -2.467   0.135    -1.99 
 [1.120]*   [1.955]    [0.979]* 
Other Asian -5.443   -4.329    -4.708 
 [1.452]**   [2.305]    [1.328]** 
Black Caribbean -4.502       -4.272 
 [0.558]**       [0.543]** 
Black African -3.252    0.189   -2.743 
 [0.861]**    [1.301]   [0.780]** 
Other Black -2.437    2.059   -2.251 
 [1.302]    [1.544]   [1.246] 
Chinese -5.122       -4.289 
 [1.510]**       [1.348]** 
Other -14.788       -13.809 
 [1.884]**       [1.811]** 
Religion         
Buddhist -1.577 -1.247 -17.936 -11.435 -30.806 -4.823 4.722 -1.532 
 [0.627]* [0.624]* [12.653] [10.591] [22.317] [10.235] [9.045] [0.620]* 
Hindu -0.803 -3.056 -51.4 -4.717 -22.463  -4.253 -0.57 
 [0.413] [3.352] [29.260] [3.074] [21.892]  [9.977] [0.352] 
Jewish 0.327 0.353     5.747 0.333 
 [0.123]** [0.107]**     [5.542] [0.118]** 
Muslim -0.413 -2.622 -3.637 -2.2 2.484  5.47 -0.216 
 [0.273] [1.196]* [2.909] [2.349] [2.341]  [4.650] [0.225] 
Sikh -1262   -6.165   -8.471 -0.969 
 [0.502]*   [3.153]   [12.043] [0.434]* 
any other religion -1.413 -1.161 -7.195 -14.754 -2.733 -36.524 -6.924 -1.357 
 [0.306]** [0.307]** [4.620] [7.626] [5.392] [29.051] [9.768] [0.300]** 
no religion at all -0.251 -0.225 -1.012 -1.201 -0.176 -6.636 10.885 -0.252 
 [0.048]** [0.045]** [0.935] [3.165] [1.424] [4.729] [3.730]** [0.048]** 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 All White Mixed Asian Black Chinese Other All 
Country of Birth         
Wales 0.402 0.382 -2.043 -0.42   4.756 0.399 
 
[0.069]** [0.061]** [2.884] [4.121]   [11.721] [0.068]** 
Scotland 0.532 0.477  -0.126 -6.817  10.936 0.529 
 
[0.052]** [0.047]**  [4.677] [10.902]  [7.437] [0.051]** 
Northern Ireland -24.305 -23.131 -13.545 -13.615   -44.93 -24.083 
 
[1.269]** [1.247]** [16.048] [17.365]   [20.541]* [1.261]** 
Country not stated -5.934 -7.18 -41.25     -6.004 
 
[1.970]** [2.189]** [25.400]     [1.969]** 
Other Variables         
Month 0.554 0.319 3.195 19.739 10.229 -24.002 -3.428 0.552 
 
[0.125]** [0.121]** [3.261] [3.220]** [3.576]** [19.874] [15.193] [0.123]** 
Sex -0.059 -0.086 0.571 0.285 2.094 0.029 9.326 -0.052 
 
[0.031] [0.030]** [0.735] [0.760] [0.931]* [4.619] [3.655]* [0.031] 
-0.064 -0.062 -0.225 0.313 -0.175 1.003 -0.331 -0.061 age completed ft 
education [0.006]** [0.005]** [0.125] [0.146]* [0.166] [0.964] [0.596] [0.006]** 
Student -0.037 -0.169 -3.004 0.926 0.46 6.471 -0.034 -0.008 
 
[0.082] [0.103] [2.079] [1.094] [1.696] [3.687] [7231] [0.079] 
       0.51 Household contains 
foreign –born 
individuals 
       [0.088]** 
Observations 880459 852497 4405 12932 7468 411 1518 880459 
Fraction Reporting 
British Identity 
0.988 0.990 0.953 0.924 0.937 0.914 0.791 0.988 
Notes. 
1. Sample is from LFS March 2002-March 2006 inclusive.   
2. Reported coefficients are marginal effects from probit model multiplied by 100. 
3. Robust standard errors, clustered on the individual are in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%. 
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Table 3 
British Identity Among the Young UK-born 
 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Ethnicity      
-0.5 -1.4 -1.9 -1.4 -1.4 Mixed:  White/Black 
Caribbean [0.5] [0.7]* [0.8]* [0.7]* [0.7]* 
-3.8 -5.7 -3.6 -1.8 -1.8 Mixed: White/Black 
African [2.2] [2.6]* [2.5] [1.5] [1.5] 
Mixed: White/Asian 
-1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -0.1 -0.1 
 [0.9] [0.7] [0.8] [0.4] [0.3] 
Mixed: Other 
-1.7 -2.9 -2 -1 -1 
 [1.2] [1.1]* [1.2] [0.9] [0.9] 
Indian 
-2.9 -6.3 -5.6 -1.3 -1.3 
 [1.1]** [0.7]** [0.8]** [0.4]** [0.4]** 
Pakistani 
-4.6 -6.8 -6 -1.3 -1.3 
 [1.8]** [0.8]** [0.9]** [0.4]** [0.4]** 
Bangladeshi 
-1.5 -2.2 -1.9 -0.1 -0.1 
 [1.1] [0.8]** [0.8]* [0.3] [0.3] 
Other Asian 
-5.4 -6.3 -5.1 -1.2 -1.2 
 [2.1]* [1.7]** [1.8]** [0.7] [0.7] 
Black Caribbean 
-3.9 -4 -3.6 -1.5 -1.5 
 [1.0]** [0.8]** [0.9]** [0.6]** [0.6]** 
Black African 
-3.1 -3.2 -2.6 -0.2 -0.2 
 [1.3]* [1.0]** [1.1]* [0.4] [0.4] 
Other Black 
-0.6 -2.1 -1.2 -0.2 -0.3 
 [1.0] [1.4] [1.2] [0.5] [0.6] 
Chinese 
-3.8 -5 -2.8 -0.3 -0.3 
 [1.8]* [1.6]** [1.2]* [0.4] [0.4] 
Other 
-10.2 -11.3 -10 -3.7 -3.7 
 [2.8]** [2.1]** [2.3]** [1.4]** [1.3]** 
Religion      
Buddhist 
-0.5     
 [0.8]     
Hindu 
-0.9     
 [0.6]     
Jewish 
-0.2     
 [0.4]     
Muslim 
-0.3     
 [0.4]     
Sikh 
-1.1     
 [0.7]     
any other religion 1.3     
 [0.6]*     
no religion at all 
-0.1     
 [0.1]     
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Table 3 (continued) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Country of Birth      
Wales 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
 [0.1]** [0.1]** [0.1]** [0.1]** [0.1]** 
Scotland 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 
 [0.1]** [0.1]** [0.1] [0.1] [0.1] 
Northern Ireland 
-27.7 -28.7 -8.6 -8.6 -8.6 
 [3.6]** [3.1]** [3.6]* [3.5]* [3.5]* 
Country not stated 
-6.8 -1.2 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 
 [4.7] [0.6]* [0.6] [0.5] [0.5] 
Other Variables      
Sex 
-0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
 [0.1] [0.0] [0.1] [0.1] [0.1] 
age completed ft 
education -0.1 -0.1 0 0 0 
 [0.0]** [0.0]** [0.0] [0.0] [0.0] 
0 0 0 0 0 Student 
[0.1] [0.1] [0.1] [0.1] [0.1] 
   -1.9 -1.7 Parent is Foreign-
Born 
   [0.3]** [0.3]** 
    0 Proxy response 
    [0.1] 
    -0.3 Proxy 
response*Parent 
Foreign Born     [0.1]* 
Observations 160288 247626 171192 169741 169737 
Fraction Reporting 
British Identity 
0.987 0.988 0.989 0.989 0.989 
Notes. 
1. Sample is from LFS March 2002-March 2006 inclusive for column 1 and March 2001-March 2006 
inclusive for the other columns.   
2. Reported coefficients are marginal effects from probit model multiplied by 100. 
3. Robust standard errors, clustered on the individual are in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%. 
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Table 4 
British Identity Among Immigrants 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Dependent Variable Identity citizenship Identity Identity identity Identity identity 
 All All All All All Non-
Citizens 
Citizens 
Ethnicity        
Mixed:  White/Black Caribbean 0.086 0.085 0.083 0.245 0.235 0.24 0.023 
 [0.103] [0.117] [0.120] [0.102]* [0.115]* [0.178] [0.073] 
Mixed: White/Black African -0.251 -0.088 -0.252 -0.118 -0.143 
-0.057 -0.09 
 [0.044]** [0.068] [0.047]** [0.079] [0.051]** [0.014]** [0.069] 
Mixed: White/Asian -0.075 0.068 -0.135 -0.078 -0.148 
-0.06 -0.062 
 [0.056] [0.069] [0.057]* [0.062] [0.056]** [0.012]** [0.060] 
Mixed: Other -0.117 -0.159 -0.058 -0.102 -0.032 0.028 -0.135 
 [0.042]** [0.039]** [0.050] [0.042]* [0.054] [0.029] [0.054]* 
Indian -0.051 0.028 -0.082 -0.082 -0.045 
-0.001 -0.032 
 [0.023]* [0.026] [0.026]** [0.038]* [0.025] [0.013] [0.023] 
Pakistani 0.064 0.045 0.017 -0.117 -0.093 
-0.015 -0.079 
 [0.052] [0.054] [0.060] [0.060] [0.041]* [0.014] [0.040]* 
Bangladeshi 0.036 0.01 0.018 -0.059 -0.023 0.005 -0.033 
 [0.063] [0.070] [0.071] [0.047] [0.031] [0.015] [0.031] 
Other Asian -0.127 -0.118 -0.095 -0.08 -0.061 
-0.018 -0.042 
 [0.020]** [0.022]** [0.025]** [0.032]* [0.025]* [0.011] [0.029] 
Black Caribbean -0.02 -0.064 0.009 -0.078 -0.013 0.004 -0.023 
 [0.041] [0.041] [0.049] [0.040] [0.025] [0.016] [0.021] 
Black African -0.169 -0.204 -0.086 -0.178 -0.07 
-0.027 -0.042 
 [0.016]** [0.015]** [0.020]** [0.051]** [0.038] [0.012]* [0.040] 
Other Black -0.094 -0.219 0.051 -0.105 0.044 0.016 0.03 
 [0.057] [0.045]** [0.073] [0.067] [0.075] [0.035] [0.055] 
Chinese -0.275 -0.248 -0.218 -0.24 -0.196 
-0.05 -0.191 
 [0.024]** [0.027]** [0.034]** [0.031]** [0.032]** [0.010]** [0.043]** 
Other -0.226 -0.204 -0.17 -0.197 -0.141 
-0.036 -0.13 
 [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.017]** [0.037]** [0.030]** [0.009]** [0.041]** 
Religion        
Buddhist -0.067 -0.055 -0.038 -0.045 -0.013 
-0.006 -0.011 
 [0.030]* [0.033] [0.035] [0.051] [0.042] [0.019] [0.026] 
Hindu -0.001 0.016 -0.004 -0.031 -0.046 
-0.006 -0.046 
 [0.021] [0.023] [0.025] [0.020] [0.017]** [0.010] [0.017]** 
Jewish -0.047 0.071 -0.105 0.087 0.015 0.05 -0.036 
 [0.048] [0.054] [0.053]* [0.044]* [0.046] [0.031] [0.045] 
Muslim 0.047 0.053 0.026 0.045 0.015 0.009 0 
 [0.017]** [0.018]** [0.020] [0.029] [0.025] [0.009] [0.019] 
Sikh -0.063 -0.095 -0.027 -0.08 -0.058 
-0.033 -0.022 
 [0.027]* [0.028]** [0.033] [0.019]** [0.015]** [0.006]** [0.018] 
any other religion -0.066 -0.022 -0.055 -0.081 -0.077 
-0.021 -0.072 
 [0.028]* [0.030] [0.031] [0.029]** [0.032]* [0.012] [0.029]* 
no religion at all 0.026 0.052 0.002 0.026 0 0.002 -0.007 
 [0.013]* [0.014]** [0.014] [0.019] [0.018] [0.008] [0.017] 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Dependent Variable Identity citizenship identity Identity identity Identity identity 
Country/Region of Birth        
Ireland -0.332 -0.341 -0.205     
 [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.017]**     
Eastern Europe 0.112 0.168 0.036     
 [0.020]** [0.022]** [0.023]     
United States -0.041 -0.118 0     
 [0.025] [0.027]** [0.026]     
Canada/Australia/NZ 0.083 0.074 0.066     
 [0.020]** [0.023]** [0.021]**     
Turkey 0.187 0.252 0.077     
 [0.034]** [0.036]** [0.039]     
Middle East/North Africa 0.353 0.417 0.191     
 [0.019]** [0.019]** [0.026]**     
India/Sri Lanka 0.292 0.34 0.148     
 [0.020]** [0.021]** [0.025]**     
Pakistan 0.284 0.403 0.129     
 [0.046]** [0.041]** [0.059]*     
Bangladesh 0.315 0.424 0.158     
 [0.050]** [0.048]** [0.065]*     
China/HK/Taiwan 0.452 0.512 0.284     
 [0.023]** [0.023]** [0.040]**     
Japan 0.158 0.065 0.122     
 [0.055]** [0.058] [0.063]     
Other Asia 0.298 0.339 0.171     
 [0.021]** [0.023]** [0.026]**     
Caribbean 0.24 0.332 0.086     
 [0.036]** [0.035]** [0.045]     
Central/South America 0.134 0.215 0.045     
 [0.030]** [0.032]** [0.034]     
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.395 0.458 0.227     
 [0.014]** [0.015]** [0.018]**     
Somalia 0.35 0.399 0.197     
 [0.030]** [0.031]** [0.043]**     
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Dependent Variable Identity citizenship identity Identity identity Identity identity 
Country-Level Variables   
Visa Required    -0.004 -0.022 
-0.003 -0.026 
    [0.054] [0.036] [0.019] [0.016] 
Commonwealth    0.08 0.038 0.009 0.031 
    [0.030]** [0.021] [0.010] [0.018] 
EU-15    -0.088 -0.065 
-0.048 0.06 
    [0.075] [0.047] [0.010]** [0.023]** 
EU A8    -0.13 -0.131 
-0.034 -0.114 
    [0.046]** [0.036]** [0.013]* [0.037]** 
Log Per capita GDP    -0.063 -0.031 
-0.013 -0.016 
    [0.022]** [0.013]* [0.007] [0.005]** 
Democracy/Autocracy    -0.011 -0.008 
-0.003 -0.005 
    [0.003]** [0.002]** [0.001]* [0.001]** 
Press Freedom    -0.002 -0.001 0 0 
    [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] 
Other Variables        
Month 0.013 0.01 -0.004 -0.003 -0.031 
-0.01 -0.021 
 [0.030] [0.035] [0.037] [0.039] [0.048] [0.024] [0.030] 
Female 0.007 -0.013 0.016 0.013 0.018 
-0.001 0.022 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.007] [0.007]** [0.004] [0.006]** 
age when compltd ft education -0.004 0.002 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 
-0.001 -0.001 
 [0.001]** [0.001] [0.001]** [0.002]* [0.002]* [0.001] [0.001] 
Student 0.005 0.023 -0.022 0.013 -0.016 
-0.011 0.001 
 [0.016] [0.018] [0.018] [0.025] [0.026] [0.010] [0.017] 
UK Citizen   0.571  0.572   
   [0.007]**  [0.017]**   
Observations 98371 89321 89240 26693 24230 13985 10204 
Notes. 
1. Sample is from LFS March 2002-March 2006  
2. Reported coefficients are marginal effects from probit model 
3. Robust standard errors, clustered on the individual are in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%. 
4. Data on Democracy/Autocracy come from Polity IV database, on press freedom from xxx 
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Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics on Rights of those living in the UK 
 Total UK-Born Foreign-Born 
 Should have Actually have Should have Actually have Should have Actually have 
freedom of speech 92.4 79.5 92.7 79.2 89.8 81.6 
freedom of thought, conscience, religion 88.1 82.0 88.1 81.8 87.9 84.2 
free elections 85.2 83.9 85.6 84.6 82.3 77.8 
Treated fairly and equally 94.1 74.3 94.3 74.3 91.8 75.1 
Free education for children 90.5 86.4 90.8 87.0 87.4 80.7 
be looked after by state if cannot look after 
yourself 
84.8 65.4 85.3 65.7 80.5 62.7 
protected from crime 94.1 71.6 94.4 71.4 91.6 73.0 
free health care if you need it 91.2 82.4 91.8 82.4 86.1 82.0 
have a job 72.8 59.7 72.4 59.1 76.3 65.1 
Notes: pooled 2003 and 2005 survey, weighted responses.  Sample sizes are approximately 16500 for the UK-born and 
6800 for the Foreign-Born though vary slightly from question to question.  
Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics on Responsibilities of those living in the UK 
  Total UK-Born Foreign-
Born 
To help and protect your family  94.9 95.1 93.2 
To raise children properly  96.8 97.1 94.5 
To work to provide for yourself  90.7 90.8 90.5 
To behave morally and ethically  93.0 93.2 90.9 
To behave responsibly  95.7 95.9 93.1 
To help others  89.1 89.3 88.1 
To treat others with fairness and respect  96.1 96.4 93.8 
To treat all races equally  93.1 93.0 93.9 
To obey and respect law  96.4 96.4 96.4 
To vote  80.4 80.5 80.1 
To respect and preserve the environment  93.9 94.1 91.9 
Notes: pooled 2003 and 2005 survey, weighted responses.  Sample sizes are approximately 16500 for the UK-born and 
6800 for the Foreign-Born though vary slightly from question to question.  
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Table 7 
Rights Should Have 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sample All UK Born Foreign 
-Born 
Foreign 
-Born 
Foreign 
-Born 
OECD 
+Europe 
Foreign 
-Born 
RoW 
Foreign 
-Born 
Demographics        
Constant 88.406 88.731 88.214 92.121 92.121 88.599 85.329 
 [0.502]** [0.526]** [2.829]** [3.444]** [3.444]** [3.615]** [2.410]** 
Male 0.304 0.239 0.651 0.548 2.789 -0.473 1.341 
 [0.271] [0.281] [0.997] [1.147] [1.388]* [1.386] [1.066] 
Degree or equivalent 1.783 1.751 2.549 1.729 0.397 3.014 3.506 
 [0.391]** [0.402]** [1.700] [2.202] [2.627] [2.227] [1.856] 
higher education below degree level 1.587 1.567 1.718 1.034 -1.31 2.658 2.045 
 [0.566]** [0.579]** [2.402] [2.580] [3.591] [3.179] [2.563] 
a level or equivalent 1.206 1.13 2.616 1.234 -2.962 6.041 2.564 
 [0.424]** [0.432]** [1.937] [2.515] [2.928] [2.580]* [2.113] 
gcse grades d-e or equivalent -3.093 -2.845 -6.676 1.363 -17.27 -0.82 -6.942 
 [0.595]** [0.602]** [2.890]* [3.749] [4.373]** [3.811] [3.066]* 
foreign and other qualifications -1.558 -2.76 0.738 -1.072 2.945 -1.508 1.397 
 [0.998] [1.303]* [2.158] [2.740] [3.162] [2.903] [2.321] 
No qualifications -4.039 -4.092 -3.141 -3.586 -5.5 -2.114 -2.276 
 [0.437]** [0.445]** [1.943] [2.282] [2.952] [2.587] [2.098] 
Age ((years-40)/10) 0.883 0.8 1.764 1.794 0.251 2.874 1.726 
 [0.104]** [0.108]** [0.408]** [0.647]** [0.588] [0.557]** [0.430]** 
Age squared -0.334 -0.289 -0.774 -0.919 -0.122 -1.093 -0.83 
 
[0.067]** [0.069]** [0.270]** [0.310]** [0.389] [0.369]** [0.288]** 
Religion        
Buddhist 1.053 2.588 0.138 3.098 0.837 -1.535 -2.826 
 [2.883] [5.118] [4.055] [4.491] [11.016] [4.650] [4.250] 
Hindu -2.902 2.463 -5.477 -2.779 46.205 -6.562 -5.204 
 [1.843] [3.611] [2.542]* [2.935] [38.231] [2.899]* [2.617]* 
Jewish -5.39 -5.176 -6.538 -1.23 -13.19 8.802 -6.587 
 [1.874]** [2.010]* [5.377] [6.300] [5.715]* [10.100] [5.381] 
Muslim -1.068 1.458 -0.878 1.845 -3.473 -1.258 -0.94 
 [1.391] [2.890] [1.929] [2.227] [3.478] [2.436] [2.071] 
Sikh 0.133 2.529 0.059 2.509 0 -1.505 0.535 
 [2.219] [3.594] [3.547] [3.956] [0.000] [3.940] [3.651] 
Any other religion -0.32 0.666 -4.498 -1.886 -0.548 -10.543 -3.628 
 [1.146] [1.237] [3.188] [3.214] [3.644] [5.267]* [3.294] 
no religion at all -0.411 -0.408 -1.601 -2.967 1.55 -8.092 -1.77 
 [0.346] [0.351] [1.628] [2.018] [1.878] [2.765]** [1.716] 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sample All UK Born Foreign 
-Born 
Foreign 
-Born 
Foreign 
-Born 
OECD 
+Europe 
Foreign 
-Born 
RoW 
Foreign 
-Born 
Country/Region of Birth        
Ireland -2.723  -3.315 -5.873 -1.181   
 [1.429]  [2.715] [3.137] [2.615]   
Eastern Europe 0.774       
 [1.757]       
OECD 0.068  -1.075 0.814 -0.802   
 [0.860]  [2.283] [2.532] [2.217]   
Middle East/North Africa -5.624  -7.76 -0.442  0.698  
 [2.186]*  [3.273]* [3.796]  [5.373]  
South Asia -0.639  -4.697 -4.367  3.789  
 [1.301]  [2.995] [3.505]  [5.066]  
China/HK/Taiwan -5.026  -5.941 -4.011  7.258  
 [2.965]  [4.221] [5.079]  [6.006]  
Other Asia -7.064  -9.912 -5.313  -0.393  
 [2.104]**  [3.391]** [3.967]  [5.196]  
Caribbean 0.144  -1.54 -4.523  6.605  
 [2.123]  [3.575] [4.217]  [5.392]  
Central/South America -5.856  -8.714 -14.177  0  
 [3.621]  [4.735] [5.366]**  [0.000]  
Sub-Saharan Africa -2.079  -3.951 -3.864  4.611  
 [1.048]*  [2.551] [2.857]  [4.779] [0.373] 
Ethnicity        
Asian -1.875 -6.403 2.418 1.94 -35.57 2.367 -1.54 
 [1.494] [2.799]* [2.521] [3.083] [17.498]* [2.866] [2.363] 
Black -2.803 -3.372 -1.087 2.516 7.286 -1.596 -2.966 
 [1.190]* [1.588]* [2.163] [2.577] [12.093] [2.411] [2.274] 
Mixed -1.065 1.569 -3.883 -1.484 -14.799 -2.476 -7.887 
 [1.776] [2.178] [3.522] [3.997] [7.505]* [4.155] [3.815]* 
chinese or other' -1.798 -0.66 -0.294 0.429 6.363 -0.245 -4.91 
 [1.742] [3.145] [2.527] [3.092] [5.742] [2.978] [2.476]* 
Assimilation/Country Vars        
Decades since Arrival    0.795    
    [0.566]    
Visa Required       2.832 
       [2.439] 
Commonwealth       -0.144 
       [1.294] 
Log Per Capita GDP       0.058 
       [0.690] 
Democracy/Autocracy       0.078 
       [0.127] 
Observations 20859 18702 2157 1243 872 1285 1921 
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.1 0.06 0.05 
Notes.   Dependent variable is out of 100.  Regressions are weighted.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Other 
variables included whose coefficients are not reported are region and year dummies. * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%. 
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Table 8 
Rights Actually Have 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sample All UK Born Foreign 
-Born 
Foreign 
-Born 
Foreign 
-Born 
OECD 
+Europe 
Foreign 
-Born 
RoW 
Foreign 
-Born 
Demographics        
Constant 83.012 83.787 84.102 82.694 90.576 88.793 83.565 
 [0.633]** [0.677]** [3.043]** [4.599]** [4.290]** [5.196]** [2.585]** 
Male -0.935 -1.105 0.549 -0.181 -0.65 1.284 0.02 
 [0.343]** [0.361]** [1.073] [1.531] [1.656] [1.424] [1.148] 
Degree or equivalent 0.692 1.084 -3.06 -0.469 -5.78 -2.139 -1.815 
 [0.493] [0.517]* [1.827] [2.946] [3.114] [2.288] [1.995] 
higher education below degree level 2.165 2.294 -0.765 2.035 -3.753 0.954 0.407 
 [0.715]** [0.746]** [2.587] [3.450] [4.273] [3.268] [2.761] 
a level or equivalent 1.001 0.893 1.456 5.287 -1.203 2.61 2.807 
 [0.535] [0.556] [2.083] [3.362] [3.474] [2.651] [2.273] 
gcse grades d-e or equivalent -2.382 -2.155 -7.471 0.577 -7.803 -7.084 -6.84 
 [0.752]** [0.775]** [3.111]* [5.004] [5.205] [3.917] [3.303]* 
foreign and other qualifications -3.799 -1.273 -8.852 -8.718 -11.78 -7.331 -7.74 
 [1.258]** [1.673] [2.323]** [3.665]* [3.760]** [2.984]* [2.500]** 
No qualifications -2.749 -2.564 -5.592 -3.812 -11.993 -2.521 -4.69 
 [0.551]** [0.574]** [2.091]** [3.053] [3.512]** [2.654] [2.259]* 
Age ((years-40)/10) 1.539 1.285 3.862 4.066 2.948 4.637 4.202 
 [0.132]** [0.139]** [0.440]** [0.866]** [0.704]** [0.572]** [0.464]** 
Age squared -0.493 -0.454 -0.86 -0.934 -0.568 -0.982 -1.1 
 
[0.085]** [0.089]** [0.291]** [0.414]* [0.463] [0.379]** [0.310]** 
Religion        
Buddhist -2.547 -0.117 -3.161 -7.993 -36.707 -0.434 -4.354 
 [3.646] [6.592] [4.379] [5.991] [13.138]** [4.792] [4.595] 
Hindu -1.664 2.25 -3.911 -5.354 16.777 -3.401 -4.578 
 [2.327] [4.651] [2.738] [3.918] [45.916] [2.980] [2.822] 
Jewish -2.518 -1.7 -6.362 -5.399 -9.223 -0.521 -6.128 
 [2.365] [2.588] [5.790] [8.402] [6.816] [10.377] [5.800] 
Muslim -1.805 -2.77 -0.486 -0.765 -9.035 0.732 -2.107 
 [1.756] [3.721] [2.079] [2.975] [4.147]* [2.504] [2.233] 
Sikh -0.352 -4.129 3.329 2.541 0 3.134 2.454 
 [2.801] [4.629] [3.820] [5.281] [0.000] [4.049] [3.936] 
Any other religion -0.562 0.595 -5.742 -5.134 -4.328 -7.082 -4.778 
 [1.443] [1.590] [3.424] [4.291] [4.348] [5.374] [3.541] 
no religion at all -1.281 -1.588 0.059 -2.077 2.866 -6.946 -0.546 
 [0.436]** [0.452]** [1.752] [2.694] [2.239] [2.839]* [1.849] 
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Table 8 (continued) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sample All UK Born Foreign 
-Born 
Foreign 
-Born 
Foreign 
-Born 
OECD 
+Europe 
Foreign 
-Born 
RoW 
Foreign 
-Born 
Country/Region of Birth        
Ireland 2.345  -0.289 -7.81 -1.155   
 [1.809]  [2.928] [4.196] [3.127]   
Eastern Europe 0.416       
 [2.217]       
OECD 1.85  0.384 -1.929 -1.911   
 [1.085]  [2.458] [3.379] [2.646]   
Middle East/North Africa 1.013  -1.367 -5.356  -6.891  
 [2.763]  [3.527] [5.068]  [4.819]  
South Asia -0.041  -4.463 -4.539  -10.398  
 [1.642]  [3.226] [4.676]  [4.589]*  
China/HK/Taiwan 2.386  0.939 -1.37  0  
 [3.726]  [4.532] [6.778]  [0.000]  
Other Asia -1.69  -4.672 -7.607  -9.047  
 [2.657]  [3.653] [5.295]  [4.458]*  
Caribbean 2.367  -2.563 -6.083  -8.249  
 [2.679]  [3.850] [5.625]  [5.111]  
Central/South America 6.605  4.754 1.955  -1.417  
 [4.570]  [5.100] [7.157]  [6.160]  
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.681  -1.061 -2.792  -6.461  
 [1.323]  [2.748] [3.810]  [4.377]  
Ethnicity        
Asian 0.583 -0.828 3.622 3.622 -17.229 2.082 1.451 
 [1.886] [3.604] [2.717] [4.116] [21.555] [2.946] [2.549] 
Black -3.76 -5.306 -0.959 -1.456 -4.766 -1.688 -1.132 
 [1.503]* [2.047]** [2.329] [3.437] [14.422] [2.477] [2.451] 
Mixed -1.965 0.465 -3.688 -6.875 -2.654 -4.796 -5.677 
 [2.241] [2.803] [3.799] [5.332] [8.951] [4.277] [4.121] 
chinese or other' -6.187 -3.947 -4.513 -0.327 4.874 -6.133 -5.765 
 [2.200]** [4.055] [2.723] [4.130] [6.848] [3.062]* [2.666]* 
Assimilation/Country Vars        
Decades since Arrival    -0.161    
    [0.757]    
Visa Required       -4.306 
       [2.629] 
Commonwealth       -0.09 
       [1.395] 
Log Per Capita GDP       -1.02 
       [0.745] 
Democracy/Autocracy       -0.053 
       [0.137] 
Observations 20852 18695 2156 1240 872 1284 1920 
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.08 
 
Notes.   Dependent variable is out of 100.  Regressions are weighted.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Other 
variables included whose coefficients are not reported are region and year dummies. * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%. 
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Table 9 
Views on Responsibilities 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sample All UK Born Foreign 
-Born 
Foreign 
-Born 
Foreign 
-Born 
OECD 
+Europe 
Foreign 
-Born 
RoW 
Foreign 
-Born 
Demographics        
Constant 95.03 95.408 91.274 92.728 93.548 91.409 90.01 
 [0.350]** [0.364]** [2.052]** [2.784]** [2.882]** [3.742]** [1.762]** 
Male 1.021 0.882 2.099 2.822 2.973 1.756 2.557 
 [0.189]** [0.194]** [0.725]** [0.931]** [1.116]** [0.977] [0.782]** 
Degree or equivalent -0.969 -1.104 0.694 0.591 -1.245 1.659 1.653 
 [0.273]** [0.279]** [1.235] [1.786] [2.088] [1.574] [1.360] 
higher education below degree level 0.768 0.588 3.011 3.635 3.719 2.101 4.199 
 [0.395] [0.401] [1.748] [2.093] [2.871] [2.244] [1.882]* 
a level or equivalent 0.599 0.548 1.849 3.844 -0.486 3.073 2.693 
 [0.296]* [0.299] [1.408] [2.041] [2.333] [1.822] [1.550] 
gcse grades d-e or equivalent -3.231 -3.123 -4.673 -1.21 -6.692 -3.612 -3.978 
 [0.416]** [0.417]** [2.103]* [3.042] [3.503] [2.690] [2.252] 
foreign and other qualifications -1.706 -1.992 -0.233 -0.328 -2.416 0.761 0.604 
 [0.695]* [0.901]* [1.568] [2.222] [2.526] [2.046] [1.701] 
No qualifications -3.999 -3.968 -3.64 -4.2 -5.117 -2.713 -2.727 
 [0.305]** [0.309]** [1.412]* [1.852]* [2.359]* [1.823] [1.539] 
Age ((years-40)/10) 1.252 1.169 2.133 1.931 2.105 2.174 2.413 
 [0.073]** [0.075]** [0.297]** [0.526]** [0.474]** [0.393]** [0.316]** 
Age squared -0.295 -0.274 -0.533 -0.337 -0.61 -0.496 -0.626 
 
[0.047]** [0.048]** [0.197]** [0.251] [0.312] [0.260] [0.211]** 
Religion        
Buddhist -2.229 -4.738 -1.15 -1.264 -2.222 -1.51 -2.324 
 [2.009] [3.548] [2.946] [3.634] [8.854] [3.274] [3.124] 
Hindu -0.838 3.048 -2.215 0.519 34.561 -3.039 -1.791 
 [1.286] [2.504] [1.850] [2.382] [30.727] [2.045] [1.924] 
Jewish 0.262 0.555 -0.809 -4.535 -0.412 -0.528 -0.292 
 [1.300] [1.393] [3.782] [4.816] [4.371] [7.127] [3.824] 
Muslim -1.964 0.336 -1.918 0.4 -0.382 -2.736 -1.717 
 [0.970]* [2.003] [1.403] [1.805] [2.791] [1.717] [1.521] 
Sikh 1.326 4.055 0.313 3.236 0 -0.649 0.386 
 [1.548] [2.492] [2.578] [3.203] [0.000] [2.776] [2.679] 
Any other religion -2.08 -1.938 -2.329 -1.345 -0.51 -4.419 -1.354 
 [0.798]** [0.856]* [2.311] [2.608] [2.929] [3.678] [2.411] 
no religion at all -1.193 -1.231 -1.75 -2.805 -0.842 -2.912 -2.25 
 [0.241]** [0.243]** [1.184] [1.638] [1.509] [1.948] [1.261] 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sample All UK Born Foreign 
-Born 
Foreign 
-Born 
Foreign 
-Born 
OECD 
+Europe 
Foreign 
-Born 
RoW 
Foreign 
-Born 
Country/Region of Birth        
Ireland 2.095  3.301 0.351 3.512   
 [1.000]*  [1.975] [2.545] [2.101]   
Eastern Europe -2.082       
 [1.220]       
OECD -1.248  0.097 2.075 -0.033   
 [0.599]*  [1.654] [2.041] [1.773]   
Middle East/North Africa -0.187  1.037 1.523  0.217  
 [1.525]  [2.376] [3.072]  [3.792]  
South Asia -0.332  0.261 -1.118  -0.874  
 [0.908]  [2.176] [2.840]  [3.576]  
China/HK/Taiwan -3.918  -2.249 -3.151  -2.597  
 [2.058]  [3.058] [4.112]  [4.228]  
Other Asia -1.75  -1.047 -0.849  -2.043  
 [1.468]  [2.464] [3.214]  [3.667]  
Caribbean 1.825  1.726 2.235  0.869  
 [1.481]  [2.598] [3.416]  [3.805]  
Central/South America 1.032  1.308 0.861  0  
 [2.528]  [3.446] [4.350]  [0.000]  
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.776  1.529 1.248  0.578  
 [0.731]  [1.852] [2.311]  [3.373]  
Ethnicity        
Asian -0.68 -3.694 1.123 1.932 -22.977 1.509 -1.126 
 [1.042] [1.940] [1.835] [2.502] [14.063] [2.022] [1.735] 
Black -1.25 -2.045 0.609 1.579 5.558 0.284 -0.072 
 [0.830] [1.101] [1.573] [2.090] [9.719] [1.699] [1.668] 
Mixed -2.49 -3.175 -0.183 -0.65 1.481 -0.707 -1.334 
 [1.239]* [1.509]* [2.565] [3.244] [6.032] [2.932] [2.804] 
chinese or other' -1.231 0.469 -0.816 -0.258 1.558 -0.994 -1.322 
 [1.215] [2.180] [1.839] [2.509] [4.615] [2.101] [1.816] 
Assimilation/Country Vars        
Decades since Arrival    -0.063    
    [0.460]    
Visa Required       -0.596 
       [1.790] 
Commonwealth       1.822 
       [0.951] 
Log Per Capita GDP       -0.487 
       [0.508] 
Democracy/Autocracy       -0.021 
       [0.093] 
Observations 20870 18708 2161 1244 874 1287 1925 
R-squared 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.07 
 
Notes.   Dependent variable is out of 100.  Regressions are weighted.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Other 
variables included whose coefficients are not reported are region and year dummies. * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%. 
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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics 
 UK-Born Foreign-Born 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
British Identity 0.988 0.108 0.459 0.498 
Age 38.371 12.421 37.643 11.122 
Female 0.482 0.500 0.459 0.498 
Age Completed FT education 1.468 2.480 2.987 3.636 
Student 0.069 0.253 0.067 0.251 
Religion 
Buddhist 0.002 0.041 0.018 0.133 
Hindu 0.003 0.054 0.075 0.263 
Jewish 0.003 0.058 0.007 0.081 
Muslim 0.009 0.095 0.198 0.398 
Sikh 0.003 0.057 0.029 0.169 
Other Religion 0.007 0.085 0.018 0.133 
No Religion 0.178 0.383 0.125 0.331 
Ethnicity 
Mixed:  White/Black Caribbean 0.002 0.047 0.001 0.034 
Mixed: White/Black African 0.001 0.024 0.004 0.060 
Mixed: White/Asian 0.001 0.038 0.004 0.061 
Mixed: Other 0.001 0.034 0.009 0.092 
Indian 0.008 0.088 0.117 0.322 
Pakistani 0.006 0.074 0.073 0.260 
Bangladeshi 0.001 0.034 0.033 0.180 
Other Asian 0.001 0.031 0.053 0.223 
Black Caribbean 0.007 0.081 0.030 0.172 
Black African 0.002 0.041 0.077 0.267 
Other Black 0.001 0.025 0.003 0.057 
Chinese 0.001 0.031 0.033 0.179 
Other 0.002 0.042 0.095 0.293 
Country/Region of Birth 
Wales 0.051 0.219   
Scotland 0.105 0.306   
Northern Ireland 0.005 0.073   
UK- Country not stated 0.000 0.018   
Ireland   0.060 0.237 
Eastern Europe   0.058 0.234 
United States   0.029 0.167 
Canada/Australia/NZ   0.050 0.218 
Turkey   0.014 0.116 
Middle East/North Africa   0.053 0.223 
India/Sri Lanka   0.107 0.309 
Pakistan   0.064 0.244 
Bangladesh   0.043 0.202 
China/HK/Taiwan   0.032 0.176 
Japan   0.007 0.082 
Other Asia   0.057 0.231 
Caribbean   0.040 0.195 
Central/South America   0.020 0.140 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
  0.187 0.390 
Somalia 
  0.012 0.109 
Age At Arrival   11.6349 20.3655 
Years Since Arrival   14.6060 17.7041 
UK Citizen 0.9761 0.1529 0.4977 0.4519 
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Figure 1 
Trends in British Identity, 2001-2006 
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Figure 2 :Trends in British Identity Among the UK-Born 
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Figure 3 : Trends in British Identity Among the Foreign-Born 
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Figure 4 
The Life-Cycle Profile in British Identity Among the UK-Born 
 
.
99
.
99
2
.
99
4
.
99
6
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
Pr
o
ba
ib
lit
y 
of
 
Br
iti
sh
 
Id
en
tit
y
20 30 40 50 60
age
 
 
Notes: These are the coefficients on the individual dummy variables for each age in the results 
reported in Table 2, column 1. 
 
Figure 5 
The Relationship Between British Identity and Country of Birth 
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Notes: Pooled LFS – only countries with more than 100 observations reported. 
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Figure 6 
British Identity for the Foreign-Born by Age of Arrival 
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Notes: The ‘DV’ estimates are the coefficients on each dummy variable for age of arrival in the first and third 
columns of Table 4.  The quartic estimates are the marginal effects predicted when replacing these dummy variables 
by a quartic. 
 
Figure 7 
British Identity for the Foreign-Born by Years Since Arrival 
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Notes: The ‘DV’ estimates are the coefficients on each dummy variable for age of arrival in the first and third 
columns of Table 4.  The quartic estimates are the marginal effects predicted when replacing these dummy variables 
by a quartic. 
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Figure 8 
Rates of Assimilation by Country/Region of Birth (No Controls for Citizenship) 
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These estimates come from separate estimation of a probit model for British identity for 
immigrants from different countries where the assimilation is modelled as a quartic. 
 
Figure 9 
Rates of Assimilation by Country/Region of Birth (controlling for citizenship) 
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These estimates come from separate estimation of a probit model for British identity for 
immigrants from different countries where the assimilation is modelled as a quartic and a control 
for citizenship is included. 
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Figure 10 
Rates of Assimilation for Democracies/Autocracies 
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Notes: these estimates come from estimation of a probit model for British identity for immigrants 
from different countries where there are controls for the characteristics of countries, assimilation 
is modelled as a quartic, and this quartic is interacted with country characteristics. 
 
Figure 11 
Rates of Assimilation by Per Capita GDP 
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Notes: as for Figure 10. 
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